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ABSTRACT
Stephanie N. Shady: Divided We Blur: Internal Party Dynamics and Position Blurring
(Under the direction of Gary Marks)
Recent literature has postulated that parties position themselves firmly along their
primary dimension and less definitively along their secondary dimension, with the goal of
maximizing vote share. Although the literature on the blurring hypothesis (Rovny 2013)
has made important strides from the perspective of elite party strategy, it has paid scarce
attention to the question of whether, or under what conditions, blurring is strategic.
Existing literature largely assumes that political parties are unitary actors, but in this
paper, I relax this assumption and examine the extent to which blurring is a consequence
of dissent within parties. I make use of a new survey item in the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (CHES) to operationalize blurred positions more directly than previous research.
After controlling for the salience of dimensions to the party, I find a strong, positive
relationship between levels of intra-party dissent and position ambiguity. The results of
this paper suggest that blurring is not always a strategic move by a unified party. Rather,
intra-party divisions contribute substantively to the ambiguity of positions of the party as
a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
“Brexit means Brexit,” Theresa May’s slogan as she bid to be the next British prime
minister, was supposed to be a clarifying statement on her position on the 2016
referendum to leave the European Union.1 Yet the British public, experts, and journalists
alike have puzzled over the meaning of her words as her Conservative-led government
negotiates the terms on which the narrow “Leave” vote is carried out. Indeed, May’s
Brexit slogan may have been just malleable enough to prevent the new prime minister
from alienating members of her own party, who have been quite publicly divided on the
issue of Brexit, both before and after the referendum. What precisely is May’s position
on Brexit, and does her view reflect the position of the Tory party as a whole? In light of
division among party members, to what extent is the public clear on the Conservative
position on Brexit and other contemporary issues in British politics? In this paper, I argue
that, as illustrated by the case of Brexit and the Tories, a chief cause of ambiguous party
positions is intra-party dissent.
The Brexit referendum highlights issues such as immigration and national identity that
have solidified a new dimension of political competition over the last couple decades, a
dimension that political elites continue to grapple with years after its emergence. In light
of the evolution of this second, cultural dimension of politics (denoted GAL-TAN in
Hooghe et al. 2002 and the libertarian-authoritarian divide in Kitschelt 1994), recent
literature has postulated that parties position themselves firmly along their primary
dimension (in the Tory case, the economic left-right) and less definitively along their
secondary dimension (for the Tories, a cultural dimension), with the goal of maximizing
1Elgot, Jessica, and Rowena Mason. 2016, June 30. “Theresa May launches Tory leadership bid with pledge to unite
country.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/30/theresa-may-launches-tory-leadership-bid-
with-pledge-to-unite-country
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vote share.2 Although the literature on the blurring hypothesis (Rovny 2013) has made important
strides from the perspective of elite party strategy, it has paid scarce attention to the question of
whether, or under what conditions, blurring is strategic or unintentional. Rovny (2012) originally
defines “position blurring” as “the deliberate misrepresentation of party positions on the part of
party leaders,” but in this paper, I conceive of blurring as an outcome that people outside of the
party may observe, as the product of action(s) rather than the action itself. I make use of a new
survey item in the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to operationalize the clarity of
dimension positions more directly than previous research (Bakker et al. 2015), which uses the
standard deviations of expert evaluations of positions as a proxy for blurring (Rovny 2012). A
new question in the 2017 CHES asks experts to place parties’ clarity of position along several
dimensions on the same 0-10 scale as the position and salience questions in the survey. With this
improved measure, I examine party characteristics that shape the clarity of a party’s positions on
issue dimensions. When do political parties project ambiguous positions? Under what conditions
might we observe a party taking an unclear position as a strategic action v. as the result of
divisions within the party? Although the survey question does not explicitly ask experts to
evaluate the reason for a party’s unclear positions, it does provide a new and useful tool for
analyzing and comparing the nature of parties within an electoral arena in the European context.
With this new operationalization, I show that party disunity fosters, perhaps unintentionally, the
outward projection of ambiguous party positions.
Strategy in a Multidimensional Arena
In the last several years, the literature on multidimensional electoral arenas has encompassed
not only defining position-taking along each dimension but also explaining clarity of positions
across dimensions. Neo-cleavage theory says that social cleavages evolve and are articulated as
new dimensions of political competition, and this evolution also transforms the party system
(Hooghe and Marks 2018). Changes in dimensions of political competition allow for new parties
2GAL-TAN stands for Green/Alternative/Libertarian-Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist.
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to emerge and require existing parties to adapt. Particularly when the changes to issue dimensions
are new (in relative historical terms), it can take time for all parties to strategize and execute a
plan of positioning along every dimension. To some extent, as the literature has previously found,
taking an ambiguous position along one dimension may be an intentional, strategic decision. Jan
Rovny’s (2012, 2013) original blurring hypothesis posits that parties whose primary dimension is
economic will take clear positions on economic issues and more ambiguous positions on cultural
issues along the GAL-TAN spectrum, and vice versa for GAL or TAN parties. From this starting
point, scholarship has begun to examine the conditions under which parties take unclear positions
and the ways in which parties might blur. Most generally, Somer-Topcu (2015) argues that broad
issue appeals can increase a party’s vote share by expanding the set of voter ideal points that align
with the party’s position. Elias, Szo¨csik, and Zuber (2015), in their introduction to a special issue
of Party Politics on party strategy in a multidimensional arena, identify four ways that parties can
adapt to the emergence of a second dimension: 1) continuing to position themselves only on a
single (primary) dimension, 2) positioning on both dimensions, 3) blurring as articulated by
Rovny, and 4) subsuming, or re-framing issues on their secondary dimension to fit into their
primary dimension (Basile 2012; Rovny and Edwards 2012).
The marriage of positioning and emphasis as complementary electoral strategies represents a
departure from a purely spatial model of voting (Downs 1957; Hotelling 1929) in favor of a
model that also recognizes the importance of issue salience to both parties and voters (Budge and
Farlie 1983; Elias, Szo¨csik, and Zuber 2015; Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989; Riker 1986;
Robertson 1976; Tomz and van Houweling 2008). Indeed, Tomz and van Houweling’s (2008)
formal model and experiments suggest heterogeneity in voter choice strategies, which include
aspects of spatial, discounting, and directional theories of voting. If voters do not uniformly vote
according to a single consideration, it is reasonable to assume that parties could not succeed
without a strategic appeal to the varying types of considerations that their target constituencies
might make. Ambiguity along a dimension of electoral competition is one such type of appeal
that a party has in its arsenal.
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Costs and Benefits of Blurring
However, taking vague positions is not always a strategic move that maximizes a party’s utility
in terms of vote share or other goals. Why might blurring not always be a strategic choice at the
party level? Historically, scholars have been divided on the extent to which blurring or ambiguity
is benefitical or costly to parties. While the blurring strategies articulated in the literature (Alonso
et al. 2015; Basile 2015; Downs 1957; Elias et al. 2015; Koedam n.d. a, b; Rovny 2012; Rovny
2013) conceptualize rational relationships among parties, voters, and issue positions and salience,
these strategies are nonetheless risky (Shepsle 1972). Blurring strategically may help a party win
votes if the party is uncertain about median voter preferences (Glazer 1990), but it also can incur
electoral costs for the party (Bartels 1986; Enelow and Hinich 1981), depending on voters’ levels
of information and risk aversion (Alvarez 1998), as well as parties’ centrism or extremism (Lo et
al. 2014). Early blurring or obfuscation literature relies heavily on the unidimensional US party
system; nevertheless, some of the highlighted costs, particularly as they relate to voter preferences
and information levels, can also apply to the multidimensional electoral arenas in contemporary
Europe.
More recent blurring literature focuses on the salience of issue dimensions to the party, but it
places less emphasis on the salience of issues/issue dimensions to the electorate. Parties have an
incentive to take clear positions on issues and/or dimensions that are highly salient to the public in
a given electoral cycle. If a party blurs on a publicly salient issue, then voters may struggle to
reconcile their ideal positions on issues that inform their vote with the candidates’ positions,
which can carry meaningful electoral consequences to the extent that voters rely upon spatial and
directional considerations (Enelow and Hinich 1981).3 Furthermore, other parties can take
advantage of competitors’ vague positioning by 1) taking clearer positions on that
issue/dimension (on either end of the position spectrum), and 2) publicly pointing out when a
competing party blurs positions, both with the goal of either capturing the competing party’s
3While I contend throughout this paper that spatial models of voting are incomplete, Tomz and van Houweling (2008) show that
spatial models do partially explain vote choice, alongside directional and discounting models.
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would-be voters or deterring the party’s constituents from turning out. Whether or not opposition
parties are successful in such endeavors, a party still faces considerable risk if it intentionally
blurs its positions, and as I show below, unclear positions are derived from more than unified
strategic moves.
Blurring: A Byproduct of Intra-party Dissent
Up to this point, much of the contemporary literature on blurring in a multidimensional
electoral arena conceives of blurring as a party strategy. Party strategy implictly assumes that
parties are unitary actors, and much of the existing literature rests on this assumption. However,
parties are not unitary actors (Lo et al. 2014). They consist of individual members and leaders, all
of whom have individual policy preferences, career goals, and geographic constituencies.
Politicians join parties to reap benefits of collective mobilization and resources as well as
crediblity vis a` vis voters (Levy 2004), but this does not negate the individuality of the
organization’s members. Particularly when faced with multiple and new dimensions of
competition, individual membership implies the potential for dissent within parties, not only
between them.
When multiple members of a party publicly take conflicting positions on an issue, it is difficult
for the public to ascertain the true position of the party. This is especially true if key figures in
party leadership, who are most visible to the public at large, disagree on an issue. Thus, even if
individual party members take clear positions on an issue, if they do not take the same clear
position, then the party’s overall position may be perceived as ambiguous. The party may have a
clear, unified position on the official party platform, but if intra-party dissent on this issue is
visible to the public through the statements or actions of individual party members, then voters
will observe a blurred de facto party position.
A prime example of this path to nebulous positioning is dissent within the Conservative party
on the Brexit referendum. On 22 June 2016, the day before the referendum, 185 Conservative
members of Parliament supported remaining in the European Union, while 138 supported
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leaving.4 The leadership in the cabinet, too, was divided on Brexit, with 24 members wishing to
remain and six wishing to leave. Hence, although Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron
set the referendum in motion, one would be hard-pressed to declare a single Tory position on the
vote. Indeed, Cameron permitted cabinet members to campaign for the side of their choice,
thereby allowing for potential internal party division on Brexit that would be visible to the public.
Once May replaced Cameron as prime minister, members of the party publicly lamented the
way she muddied the waters on her Brexit position. One senior member stated anonymously to
the Guardian, “It comes back to the fact that no one knows what the prime minister really
thinks–everyone’s projecting their [sic] worst fears on to her.”5 The outward ambiguity of May’s
stance as the leader of her party allows members within her party the freedom to interpret May’s
position to help advance their own pro-Leave or pro-Remain positions when they communicate
with their constituents. As a result, even though individual members may take clear stances on
Brexit, the net party position is not clear. Therefore, I expect that the greater degree of intra-party
dissent, the more ambiguous the party’s positions will be.
Data and Methods
Key Variables
The dependent variable in this paper is the degree of ambiguity of a party’s positions. I expect
the theory above to be generalizable to any issue dimension; however, in this paper I test my
hypothesis with the GAL-TAN dimension because I have data for an appropriate measure of my
corresponding key independent variable, intra-party dissent. The GAL-TAN dimension is newer
than the economic left-right, and it encompasses a wide variety of issues related to
multiculturalism, social behaviors, and civil liberties, which may not always be in alignment with
each other. Therefore, operationalizing my dependent variable of position ambiguity with the
4BBC. “EU vote: Where the cabinet and other MPs stand.” 22 June 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-
35616946 MPs who had not yet declared a position omitted from count.
5Stewart, Heather. 2018, January 29. “Theresa May told to clarify Brexit stance or face no-confidence vote. The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/28/may-urged-clarify-brexit-position-face-no-confidence-vote
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less-solidified GAL-TAN dimension is a conservative test of my hypothesis. While the most
common measure of blurring in the literature to date, the standard deviation of expert placements
of a party’s position, could measure variation in expert perception of position, the measurement I
use in this paper is more direct. I measure blurred possitions using the 2017 CHES survey item
that asks experts to place the clarity of a party’s position on dimensions using the same 0-10 scale
as the position and salience questions in the survey (Bakker et al. 2015).6 I reverse the scale of the
variable such that 0 represents the clearest position and 10 the most blurred.
The key independent variable in my analysis is intra-party dissent, which I operationalize
using a measure of dissent on immigration policy. Like the dependent variable above, intra-party
dissent is measured in the CHES by expert placements on a 0-10 scale, where higher values
indicate greater dissent. The dependent variable evaluates blurred positions along an entire
dimension (GAL-TAN), while my independent variable evaluates dissent along a single policy
(immigration) within the GAL-TAN dimension. Data availability does not allow me to measure
both dissent and blurred positions on a dimension alone, nor on a single issue alone. However,
immigration policy positions are strongly correlated with GAL-TAN positions (ρ = 0.87); strict
immigration policies are positively associated with more extreme TAN positions. While
immigration encompasses a blend of economic and cultural considerations, recent research has
shown that it is the cultural aspect that leads public opinion and thus is most relevant for political
competition (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Therefore, intra-party dissent on immigration
policy is an appropriate indicator of dissent on the GAL-TAN dimension in contemporary
electoral arenas. Figure 1 below illustrates the positive association between intra-party dissent on
immigration and blurring on GAL-TAN, and I test the strength of this relationship under the
controls outlined below. As a secondary, more general indicator of internal dissent, I include a
measure in the CHES that asks experts to evaluate the extent to which party leadership v.
members wield control over party policy positions, which is scaled from 0 (members have
complete control) to 10 (leadership has complete control). I expect that the more control members
6See Appendix 1 for a complete description of variables used, and Appendix 2 for descriptive statistics of all variables.
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have over official party positions, the less ambiguous positions will be, because there is an official
means by which intra-party disagreement is mediated before the party as a unit takes an official
position. In contrast, if control over official positions is concentrated in the hands of a few
leaders, then other members have less voice in the official party platform and may have incentives
to defect from the leadership’s decisions.
Controls
Following Rovny (2012, 2013), I control for the salience of both the GAL-TAN and economic
left-right dimensions to the party, both of which are measured by expert placement on a scale
from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most salient (see also Abou-Chadi 2014; Meguid 2005).7
Additionally, I control for extremity of party position on GAL-TAN, measured by the absolute
distance of the party’s position from the median position, with the expectation that the more
extreme a party is along GAL-TAN, the less ambiguous its position will be.8 The positions are
measured by expert placement on a scale from 0 (most left/GAL) to 10 (most right/TAN).9
Finally, a potential reason that experts might perceive blurred positions on a dimension is a shift
in the party’s position in recent history. Therefore, I include a measure of the absolute value of the
difference between parties’ 2017 and 2014 positions on the GAL-TAN dimension in the CHES.
Since the 2017 survey includes some new parties, I run models with and without the position shift
measure so that I do not obscure the role of new parties in shaping behavior in the electoral arena.
7Since salience of dimensions to the party is a more fine-grained measure of party type than categories of party family, I do not
control for party family in the models presented in this paper. However, when party family is added to my models as a control, the
central findings do not change.
8The median GAL-TAN position for 2017 is 5.0357.
9The 2017 CHES includes two measures of GAL-TAN position and salience, one that has been used over time and simply asks
experts to place parties on the GAL-TAN scale, and a new one that cues experts to think about a variety of issues that fall under the
GAL-TAN dimension before asking them to place parties. The two measures are strongly correlated, ρ = 0.97 for position and
ρ = 0.78 for salience to party, so in this paper, I use the old measure to allow future research to analyze my findings over time.
Models run with the new GAL-TAN measure did not substantively change my results.
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In addition to salience and position controls, I control for the party’s level of populism
since populist appeals (and the rebuke of them) have proliferated over the last several
years and are relevant to party strategy in contemporary European electoral arenas (c.f.
Rooduijn et al. 2016). The 2017 CHES has two questions that tap into the populist nature
of parties, so I take the average of each party’s scores on these two measures to create an
indicator of populism. The first question asks to what extent the use of anti-elite rhetoric
is central to a party’s strategy, and the second asks to what extent parties favor
decision-making by elites v. “the people.” Both measures are scaled from 0 to 10, with
higher numbers indicating greater salience of anti-elite rhetoric and favor of “the people”
making decisions over political elites. I also include a measure of government
participation from the CHES, because the literature often discusses reputational costs of
deviating from clear, consistent positions for parties in government (Koedam n.d.).
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Relatedly, on the grounds that today’s older parties emerged on the basis of the
historically salient economic left-right cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), whereas the
GAL-TAN dimension is the raison d’eˆtre for contemporary political entrepreneurship, I
control for party age by calculating the number of years since the party was first included
in the CHES.10 Finally, I control for a party’s vote share in the most recent election as of
2017. I choose to control for vote share rather than legislative seat share because vote
share is more consistently measurable across party systems, whereas seat share depends
on country-specific electoral rules.
Method
To test my hypothesis, I run linear mixed effects models with country random effects
to allow for varying intercepts by country.11 By holding country effects constant, I
control for variation in electoral systems, issues salient to the public, and other
country-specific nuances. My theory should hold across countries, since its crux rests on
variation in party-level, not party system-level, characteristics. I opt for a random
intercept model rather than country fixed effects because I assume that relevant political
characteristics of the EU member states in the data are drawn from the same distribution,
given that they share some political and economic authority and face similar external
shocks such as the 2008 eurocrisis and influx of refugees in 2015. The models discussed
below can be generalized in the following form for each party i in country j:
galtan ambiguityij = β0 + β1immigration dissentij + β2members v leadershipij
+ β3galtan salienceij + β4galtan extremityij + βncontrolsij + ij
10The first CHES was fielded in 1999. I subtract the first survey year where the party is included from 2017 since I am
using the 2017 CHES in this paper.
11The 2017 CHES includes the following countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
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Results
The results in Table 1 below present strong evidence to support my hypothesis that
intra-party dissent increases the ambiguity of a party’s positions. Model 1 includes new
parties as of the 2017 CHES; Model 2 includes the position shift control (which does not
yield statistically significant results) and this drops new parties from the analysis.12
Under controls and in both models, there is a positive, statistically significant (p < .01)
relationship between dissent on immigration policy and degree of ambiguity of the
party’s position along the GAL-TAN dimension. A second measure of internal party
dynamics, the extent to which members v. leadership wield control over official party
policy positions, also has a positive association with GAL-TAN opaqueness, in line with
my expectation, though it does not reach statistical significance.
Table 1: Models of Blurred Positions
Blurred Position on GAL-TAN
Model 1 Model 2
Includes new parties Includes position shifts
Immigration dissent 0.242∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.056)
Members v. leadership 0.013 0.037
(0.036) (0.043)
GAL-TAN salience −0.514∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.076)
GAL-TAN extremism −0.349∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.094)
GAL-TAN position shift 0.038
(0.079)
Constant 8.506∗∗∗ 8.389∗∗∗
(0.667) (0.766)
N 125 103
Marginal R2 0.803 0.803
Conditional R2 0.830 0.819
Log Likelihood −134.823 −115.717
AIC 293.646 257.434
BIC 327.586 291.686
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 . Standard errors in parentheses.
Across models, the negative and statisically significant (p < .01) effect of GAL-TAN
12Key variables of interest in the models under controls are presented here. For full models with detailed information on
controls, see Appendix 3.
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salience to the party on GAL-TAN blurring corroborates Rovny’s (2012, 2013) original
blurring hypothesis; parties have clearer positions along their primary dimension of
electoral competition and more ambiguous positions along their secondary dimension of
electoral competition. As expected, the more extreme a party is along GAL-TAN, the less
ambiguous its position is on the dimension (p < .01). In Model 2, although the effects of
GAL-TAN position shift do not reach statistical significance, it is in the expected
direction; shift in GAL-TAN position increases opaqueness along this dimension.
The models in Table 1 present the results for the key variables of interest under
controls; additional information about the residual effects of control variables are
presented in Appendix 3. Several of the control variables exert substantively small but
statistically significant effects on blurred GAL-TAN positions. Parties with higher vote
share blur more on GAL-TAN (p < 0.05). Additionally, there is a negative, though
substantively small, relationship (p < 0.01) between party age and blurring; older parties
are less likely than newer parties hold ambiguous positions on GAL-TAN. This result is
somewhat surprising given the historical primacy of the economic left-right to these older
parties, but given the size of the effect, it may be a residual of internal cohesion over time
that is not picked up by the dissent on immigration policy measure.
Conclusion
Using a newly available measure of dimension blurring that is more direct than
previous measures, I have shown that, contrary to the focus of existing literature, blurring
positions can be but is not always a strategic choice. Rather, although a party’s primary v.
secondary dimension does have some bearing on the degree of blurring, the direction of
the effect on blurring is the same for the salience of both the economic left-right and
GAL-TAN dimensions, so primary and secondary dimensions cannot be the whole of the
story. Instead, I find that intra-party dissent also results in blurred positions along an issue
dimension. The results of this paper represent a first step in studying the clarity of party
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positions with a new measure, which has thus far been a useful survey item that is ripe for
further analysis. Although this paper has focused on blurring along the GAL-TAN
dimension, similar work should be conducted on blurring along the economic left-right
dimension for a fruitful comparison as appropriate data becomes available.
Most importantly, in this paper I have provided evidence that blurring along an issue
dimension is not always a strategic move, but rather a byproduct of intra-party dissent
and other characteristics of the party. The findings in this paper imply that the assumption
that parties behave as unitary actors limits our ability to expand research, and future work
should strive to address the impact of internal party dynamics in addition to inter-party
dynamics. Furthermore, the results of this paper are an important point of departure for
future research on the differences in conditions that political entrepreneurs, such as new
radical TAN parties today, face when seeking to maximize their vote share, as opposed to
parties with pre-existing reputations among voters. As scholars continue to study this
common phenomenon of ambiguous party positioning, we should also consider the
implications for longstanding theories of voting, especially spatial theories, that depend
on the assumption that voters can evaluate parties on the basis of clear positions.
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APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Table 2: Description of variables
Variable Description
Blurred position on GAL-TAN Clarity of a party’s position on libertarian-authoritarian is-
sues. Original scale reversed such that scale runs from 0
(completely clear) to 10 (not at all clear). Source: Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2017.
Immigration dissent Expert placement of party on scale from 0 (party was
completely united) to 10 (party was completely divided).
Source: CHES 2017.
Members v. leadership Expert placement of party on scale from 0 (members and ac-
tivists have complete control over party policy) to 10 (lead-
ership has complete control over party policy). Source:
CHES 2017.
Left-right salience Expert placement of salience to party on scale from 0 (no
importance) to 10 (great importance). Source: CHES 2017.
GAL-TAN salience Expert placement of salience to party on scale from 0 (no
importance) to 10 (great importance). Source: CHES 2017.
Populism Mean score on two expert evaluations of party positions on
1) People v. elite: scaled from 0 (elected office holders
should make the most important decisions) to 10 (“the peo-
ple,” not politicians, should make the most important deci-
sions), and 2) Salience of anti-elite rhetoric: scaled from 0
(not important at all) to 10 (extremely important). Source:
CHES 2017.
GAL-TAN extremism Absolute distance of a party’s GAL-TAN position from the
median GAL-TAN position across all parties in data set.
Expert placement of party on scale from 0 (GAL) to 10
(TAN). Source: CHES 2017.
GAL-TAN position shift Absolute value of the difference between GAL-TAN party
positions in 2017 and 2014. Source: CHES 2014, 2017.
Vote share Percentage of votes party received in most recent legislative
election as of 2017. Source: CHES 2017.
Party age Number of years since a party is first included in the CHES,
which has been released in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014,
and 2017. Equal to 2017 - year included. Source: Ches
1999-2017.
Government Indicator of party’s government participation in 2017. It
takes on the values of 0 (no participation), 0.5 (participation
during part of the year), or 1 (participation during entire
year). Source: CHES 2017.
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APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable Min. 1st Q. Median Mean 3rd Q. Max.
GAL-TAN blurring 1.077 2.852 3.684 3.711 4.512 8.769
Immigration dissent 0.000 1.563 2.538 2.659 3.472 7.444
Members v. leadership 1.667 5.429 6.537 6.608 8.070 10.000
Left-right salience 2.500 5.200 6.348 6.305 7.508 9.333
GAL-TAN salience 1.000 5.486 6.268 6.347 7.514 9.400
Populism 0.8929 3.031 4.658 4.965 6.750 9.875
GAL-TAN extremism 0.0357 1.3395 2.4965 2.4468 3.5770 4.9643
GAL-TAN position shift 0.000 0.208 0.500 0.695 0.861 6.973
Vote share 0.010 2.775 6.647 10.479 13.090 42.400
Party age 0.000 3.000 15.000 10.330 18.000 18.000
Note: Government is an indicator of position in the year 2017. It takes on the value of 0
(no participation, frequency= 99), 0.5 (participation during part of the year,
frequency= 15), or 1 (participation during entire year, frequency= 18).
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Table 4: Correlation of variables
GAL-TAN blurring Immigration dissent Members v. leadership L-R salience
GAL-TAN blurring 1.00
Immigration dissent 0.46 1.00
Members v.leadership 0.13 -0.25 1.00
L-R salience 0.06 0.26 -0.08 1.00
GAL-TAN salience -0.72 -0.27 0.02 -0.30
Populism -0.01 -0.35 0.16 -0.39
GAL-TAN extremism -0.75 -0.50 -0.05 -0.30
Vote share 0.16 0.28 0.29 0.35
Government 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.17
Party age -0.11 0.32 -0.13 0.33
GAL-TAN salience Populism GAL-TAN extremism
GAL-TAN salience 1.00
Populism 0.13 1.00
GAL-TAN extremism 0.73 0.36 1.00
Vote share -0.03 -0.12 -0.11
Government 0.03 -0.28 -0.15
Party age -0.08 -0.36 -0.10
Vote share Government Party age
Vote share 1.00
Government 0.54 1.00
Party age 0.26 0.24 1.00
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APPENDIX 3: FULL MODEL WITH CONTROLS
Table 5: Full models with controls
Blurred Position on GAL-TAN
Model 1 Model 2
Includes new parties Includes position shifts
Immigration dissent 0.242∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.056)
Members v. leadership 0.013 0.037
(0.036) (0.043)
Left-right salience −0.226∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.052)
GAL-TAN salience −0.514∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.076)
Populism 0.036 0.028
(0.032) (0.035)
GAL-TAN extremism −0.349∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.094)
GAL-TAN position shift 0.038
(0.079)
Vote share 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
Government 0.086 0.089
(0.192) (0.195)
Party age −0.035∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012)
Constant 8.506∗∗∗ 8.389∗∗∗
(0.667) (0.766)
N 125 103
Marginal R2 0.803 0.803
Conditional R2 0.830 0.819
Log Likelihood −134.823 −115.717
AIC 293.646 257.434
BIC 327.586 291.686
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01 . Standard errors in parentheses.
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